This submission argues that it is in Britain's best interest to take the lead in the field of nuclear disarmament. We wish to remind those involved in the review
process of the strong opposition to nuclear arms from a wide spectrum of Scottish society and of the true cost of Trident. We are concerned that
the Trident programme represents a significant escalation in Britain's nuclear capability. In the light of this we wish to recommend a series of
concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament.
In the light of this situation, Britain is presented with an opportunity to take a position of moral leadership in the international community by making progress towards nuclear disarmament. The choice to develop Trident was made in the late 1970s and the nuclear policy review at that time was conducted in secret and would appear to have been technologically driven, concerned with which weapon system should replace Polaris. There is now the opportunity for an open, Foreign Policy led, root and branch reappraisal of Britain's policy towards nuclear arms.
It is in the interest of Britain to comply and to be seen to comply with international law, and to be seen to be acting in a way which is consistent with the views of the majority of members of the international community. Making progress towards nuclear disarmament would both enhance Britain's position in responding to the views expressed in successive resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and also in fulfilling our obligations under international law.
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty lays down an obligation on all states to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. This legal requirement was also clearly expressed in the Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons given by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to the United Nations General Assembly in July 1996 [2].
Safety problems with the WE-177 bombs have created the situation where Britain's nuclear arsenal from 1998 could consist of only one type of device, Trident [3]. The question then arises - whether there are any realistically conceivable circumstances in which Trident could be used, which would be in compliance with international law.
The ICJ Opinion makes it clear that any use of nuclear weapons, or threat to use nuclear weapons, must comply with humanitarian law [4]. The Geneva Convention Protocols of 1977 expressly forbid the use of any weapon which is likely to cause widespread environmental damage [5]. The ICJ opinion made it clear that it would be illegal to use a weapon which could not distinguish between civilian and military targets [6]. The British Judge, Rosalyn Higgins said "it may be concluded that a weapon will be unlawful per se if it is incapable of being targeted at a military objective only, even if collateral harm occurs .. To the extent that a specific nuclear weapon would be incapable of this distinction, its use would be unlawful" [7].
A former director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has said that the British Trident warhead is a "Dutch copy" of the US W76 [8]. The US warhead is generally assumed to have a yield in the 80 -100 kiloton range. A nuclear explosion of this magnitude would result in widespread damage to the environment. The explosion would devastate such a wide area that it could not be used exclusively against a military target. Therefore the use or threat to use Trident would be illegal.
The international community places an emphasis on tackling nuclear proliferation. The greatest contribution which Britain can make in this quest is for us to join the list of those who have deliberately chosen to get rid of their nuclear weapons. This step would give Britain the moral basis from which it would be possible to promote tougher international measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.
Britain's current nuclear posture is provocative towards Russia. Plans to expand the Trident force would further aggravate this. The deployment of submarines on constant patrol is a measure which only has significance within the realm of East-West conflict. The only countries with forces which could threaten a conspicuous British nuclear force on the surface are the US, France and Russia. It has long been beyond the realm of possibility that the US or France would launch an attack. It is now scarcely any more credible that Russia would.
Britain should show the lead to the US and France and move towards nuclear disarmament. Rather than continuing to fan the embers of the Cold War, we should show the other nuclear powers the way to climb down from the hostile posture inherited from the past. We have a choice. On the one hand Britain can continue to threaten Russia with nuclear annihilation and in doing so help to prop up the nuclear weapons establishment there. Alternatively we can move towards eliminating our own arsenal, ease the tension and help to build the climate in which the US, Russia and France can all make substantial progress towards nuclear disarmament.
The withdrawal of WE-177 will mean that any nuclear weapons which Britain continues to have will be based in Scotland. The views of the people of Scotland towards nuclear arms are therefore becoming increasingly important. A wide range of institutions and individuals, across the wide spectrum of Scottish society, have made clear their objection to nuclear weapons in general and to Trident in particular.
The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland has said that "nuclear arms, including the readiness to use them, are by their nature morally and theologically wrong" [9]. All of the Scottish Roman Catholic Bishops sent declarations to the International Court of Justice saying "it is my belief that nuclear weapons are morally wrong." Such weapons have also been condemned by leaders of other faiths.
At its 1996 conference the Scottish Labour Party agreed that "this conference urge an incoming Labour Government to discontinue the Trident programme, concurrent with the formation of an Arms Conversion Agency, and calls on the Party to emphasise more socially useful ways of using the money allocated to the Trident programme in Party literature" [10].
The Scottish National Party recently made clear their position: "The SNP have a long standing objection to nuclear weapons. We will negotiate a phased but complete withdrawal of Trident from the Clyde and invest our savings from this costly, deadly and unnecessary nuclear deterrent in conventional defence as well as in other priorities including health and education" [11].
In 1996 the Scottish Trades Union Congress passed a resolution saying "that this Congress expresses its opposition to the Trident nuclear submarine programme. The potential estimated operating costs of 30 billion pounds over the next 25 years could be more usefully deployed in pump priming the Scottish economy by investing in training, skills and improved public services" [12].
Many Scottish Local Authorities are part of the Nuclear Free Local Authorities movement and are opposed to the Trident nuclear weapons based at Faslane.
The last opinion poll conducted on this issue in April 1992 asked the question "Currently the UK is proposing to increase its sea-based nuclear weapons system, at a cost of approximately 10.5 billion pounds. How strongly do you agree or disagree with this proposal ?". 70 % of those polled in Scotland disagreed with the proposal [13].
We consider that official statements on the cost of Trident fail to give the full picture. The annual running costs of Trident have been given as 200 million pounds[14]. However we question whether this represents a realistic estimate of the proportion attributable to Trident of the costs of operating the facilities at the Clyde Naval Base Faslane, Royal Armaments Depot Coulport and the Atomic Weapons Establishments. Details of the costs of the nuclear weapons programme and of the nuclear powered submarine programme are not publicly available, however we believe that if they were they would show that the costs of keeping Trident are much higher than 200 million pounds per year. In addition, the estimate does not take into account the substantial cost of forces which are assigned to protecting Trident. The 1996 Statement on Defence Estimates indicates that two nuclear powered submarine were required to protect Trident [15]. We understand that support for Trident is the primary role of 819 squadron at RNAS Prestwick [16]. Nimrod aircraft at RAF Kinloss and other units also provide protection for Trident [17]. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has estimated that the true annual cost of Trident is around 1,500 million pounds per year [18].
There is still scope for substantial savings to be made from the Trident procurement budget. The latest shows that 1,500 million pounds of this has not yet been spent [19]. The airframe and motors of a Trident missile costs around 21 million dollars and the guidance system a further 10 million dollars per missile. If no more Trident missiles are purchased it would be possible to save at least 434 million dollars (261 million pounds) [20].
At a time when we should be disarming, the strength of Britain's nuclear armed submarine force has substantially increased. If the momentum of the Trident programme is allowed to continue unchecked then British nuclear forces will continue to grow.
Number of nuclear armed submarines
For much of the last five years there have been two operational nuclear armed submarines, but on current plans this will increase to three in 1998 and to four in 2000.
HMS Revenge was decommissioned in April 1992 and HMS Renown became operational in June 1993 after completing a refit and work up. Between these dates there were two operational armed Polaris submarines, HMS Repulse and HMS Resolution. In late 1993 and early 1994 HMS Repulse was undergoing repairs at Faslane and was probably not operational. From May 1996 until June 1997 there have been two armed, operational Trident submarines, HMS Vanguard and HMS Victorious.
The Ministry of Defence has said that HMS Vigilant will become operational in 1998, increasing the number of armed submarines to three. Devonport dockyard have said that they do not expect HMS Vanguard to enter refit until 2002 [21]. Given the current state of progress with the Trident refit project the delay could be longer. This means that if the Government continues to bring the fourth submarine, HMS Vengeance, into service on the original timescale, the number of operational submarines will increase to four in 2000.
Number of nuclear armed missiles
From April 1992 to June 1993 the maximum number of Polaris A3 missiles which could have been deployed on submarines was 32. In June 1997 the number of Trident D5 missiles deployed is 28. On current plans this number will increase to 38 in 1998 and to 48 in 2001.
By 1993 the total number of missiles which had been ordered was 44. HMS Vanguard test fired 2 missiles and loaded with 16 missiles in 1994. HMS Victorious test fired 2 missiles and loaded with 12 missiles in 1995. This gives the current figure of 28 missiles deployed. We suspect that it is planned that HMS Vigilant will test fire 2 missiles and load with 10 missile in the summer of 1997, increasing the total deployed to 38.
The previous government ordered 7 Trident missiles as part of the US Fiscal Year 1997 production order. These missiles are scheduled to be available from FY99. The previous government anticipated that a further 7 missiles would be ordered in the FY98 order, to be available in FY2000 and then 7 more missiles in the FY99 order to be available in FY2001 [22]. The US government is likely to seek confirmation of the FY98 order by 30 August 1997 and to place an order with the Lockheed Corporation in November1997 [23].
The US government probably plans to give details of the FY99 order in June 1998, seeking confirmation in August 1998 with a view to placing a contract in November 1998.
If the government goes ahead with these orders then the total number of missiles ordered will increase to 65. Parliamentary answers on the proportion of these which would be operational indicate that it was projected that 48 of these missiles would be deployed operationally [24]. The delivery schedule suggests that, on current plans, this figure would be reached in 2001.
Number of nuclear warheads There is no reliable basis on which to accurately estimate the number of Chevaline warheads which were deployed in the early 1990s, or the number of Trident warheads which have been or are scheduled to be produced. We can estimate the total number of movements made by TCHD Mk 2 nuclear weapon transporters. From May 1995 to February 1997 there were around 73 lorry movements taking Chevaline from RNAD Coulport to RAF Honington and RAF Marham for temporary storage prior to dismantling. From November 1992 to February 1997 we estimate there were 128 lorry movements delivering Trident warheads to RNAD Coulport from AWE Burghfield. This indicates an increase of 55 lorry loads of Trident over Chevaline, suggesting that the number of Trident warheads is 175 % of the number of Chevaline warheads.
We suspect that in practice the maximum number of warheads carried in each vehicle is two, with some vehicles carrying one. The total number of Chevaline warheads was probably around 110 - 130 and the number of Trident warheads delivered to Coulport may in the region of 200 - 250. One third of the Trident lorry movements were between November 1992 and August 1993, just before HMS Vanguard was commissioned, a second third from September 1993 to July 1995, before HMS Victorious loaded with missiles, and the remainder since August 1995.
We suspect that the current production plan is that more Trident warheads would be built increasing the total further.
Number of targets which can be destroyed
Although each Polaris A3 missile may have carried 2 Chevaline nuclear warheads, the missile could only be used against one target. From April 1992 to June 1993 the two operational Polaris submarines combined could probably destroy 32 targets. Trident missiles have Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles and each warhead can be used against a separate target. The Trident force deployed in June 1997, with perhaps 140 warheads on 2 submarines could destroy 140 targets. With 3 submarines operational from 1998, this will increase to around 210 targets which could be destroyed. Whatever the actual Trident warhead numbers there is no doubt that, in terms of the number of targets which could be destroyed, the British nuclear submarine force has already increased substantially, and on existing plans will increase further.
Comparison of Polaris A3 and Trident D5 missiles
Replacing Polaris A3 missiles with Trident D5 missiles in itself constitutes a major escalation in Britain's nuclear forces. Polaris A3 had a range of around 4700 km and Trident D5 has a range of at least 7400 km and up to 11000 km with a reduced payload. Trident Mk 4 reentry vehicles have a Circular Error of Probability of around 150 metres, the equivalent for Chevaline was probably at least several hundred metres.
The actual state of Polaris A3 missiles from the 1980s onwards was questionable. Missile tests carried out in the early 1980s revealed significant problems and replacement rocket motors had to be manufactured. Normally missiles have been tested at intervals of one or two years. However the last Polaris missile test was carried out from Repulse in 1987. In 1993, when there were a maximum of 32 missiles deployed, it was 6 years since any missile had been tested. By 1996 it was 9 years since they had last been tested. Any official calculations which have been carried out into the actual capability of the UK nuclear forces must have taken into account the increasing unreliability of the missiles.
Summary of imminent nuclear escalation The following steps would further increase Britain's nuclear forces:
(a) Arming HMS Vigilant with missiles in summer 1997 and with nuclear warheads in late Autumn 1997.
(b) Sea trials, work up and arming of HMS Vengeance from 1998 to 2000.
(c) Placing orders for 7 Trident missiles in August 1997 and for 7 more in August 1998.
(d) Manufacture of warhead pits at AWE Aldermaston, assembly of nuclear warheads at AWE Burghfield and transport of warheads to RNAD Coulport.
Not only should Britain avoid further increasing our nuclear forces, but we should be taking positive steps to scale down the threat which they pose.
De-targeting
Britain has already announced that its weapons are de-targeted. An official in the Nuclear Policy Directorate of the Ministry of Defence has written saying "The measures we intend to implement will ensure that guidance computers on board UK Polaris and Trident missiles will not routinely hold targeting information, and the primary target assignments for insertion into the missiles will be points in the open ocean. .. As with the de-targeting measures to be taken by the US, it will be possible quickly to restore operational targets to the missiles should the need arise. The significance of these measures, which will not be verifiable, is primarily political and symbolic" [25].
It is clear that at present there is no provision for verification of de-targeting and that the missiles can quickly be retargeted. The reference is to the computer system on the missiles. It is likely that targeting data is still held elsewhere within the fire control system, which is on board the submarine but not part of the missiles. Targets can probably be restored within a matter of minutes.
This appears to be a very limited measure towards disarmament.
Taking Trident off-patrol
The current Trident force is at about 15 minutes notice to launch a nuclear attack. This posture means that nuclear armed submarines are on a war-footing. Commander Jeffrey Tall who was Captain of HMS Repulse from 1989 to 1991 said "there is no doubt that when you went to sea you went to war" [26].
Taking Trident off continuous patrol would immediately lower the level of threat to Russia. It would also be possible for other countries to verify that this measure had been taken. Taking submarines off patrol would also open up the possibility of taking further steps, such as removing the warheads from the missiles.
Maintaining continual patrols is not only provocative, it also increases the risk of a nuclear accident. The former Minister, Alan Clark, suggests in his diary for January 1990 that the Prime Minister of the day overruled the advice of the Atomic Energy Authority and kept submarines on station, when there was serious concern about a serious defect in their nuclear reactors [27]. There is a strong case for arguing that Polaris submarines should all have been withdrawn from service, on safety grounds, in 1990 [28]. The full account of this has not so far been made public.
Removing nuclear warheads from Trident missiles
The physical separation of warheads from missiles would be a significant concrete step towards nuclear disarmament. This would remove the fear that a nuclear attack could be launched by Britain at short notice. This is also something which could, if appropriate steps were taken, be subject to verification.
The Drell report into US nuclear weapon safety identified hazards with Trident missiles [29]. The nuclear warheads are placed around the relatively volatile fuel in the 3rd stage of a each missile. Separation of missiles and warheads would also reduce the risk of an accident.
Dismantlement of nuclear warheads
The most significant measure which the United Kingdom could make towards global nuclear disarmament would be to initiate a programme for the dismantlement of the entire current arsenal of nuclear warheads. This could be done in a verifiable way.
(1) The Non Aligned Movement was behind the Resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 11 December 1996 which "calls on all states to commence multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination."
(2) International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para 105 (2) F states "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".
(3) Professor Oxburgh's report into "The Safety of UK nuclear weapons", July 1992, recommended that a design review into the WE-177 be carried out forthwith. A substantial number of WE-177 warheads were dismantled around 1993. We believe that the decision to decommission WE-177 in 1998 stems from this review and from the examination of warheads which had been dismantled.
(4) ICJ Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para 105 (2) D.
(5) The Geneva Convention Protocols 1977 article 35 (3) prohibits "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment." Article 55 restates this.
(6) ICJ Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para 78 - "states must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets."
(7) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, ICJ, 8 July 1996, para 24.
(8) The Moscow Criterion, BBC, July 1995.
(9) Deliverance of the 1983 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.
(10) Scottish Labour Party 81st Conference, Edinburgh 1996.
(11) SNP election manifesto April 1997.
(12) STUC 1996 Congress.
(13) Online Telephone Surveys / Greenpeace April 1992.
(14) Hansard 16 June 1997.
(15) SDE 96; On 24 December 1994 two Trafalgar class submarines were deployed at short notice to protect HMS Vanguard which had sailed to go out on patrol on 14 December.
(16) Navy News Fleet Air Arm supplement 1996.
(17) SDE 96.
(18) "Annual Running Costs of Trident", CND.
(19) Hansard 16 June 1997.
(20) Hansard 18 June 1997. Cost of guidance is estimated on the basis of figures shown in a US paper "Missile Cost Analysis, Trident II (D-5), FY 92-94, (exhibit p-12)".
(21) Statement by DML representative at Devonport, 24 March 1997.
(22) Hansard 18 June 1997. Delivery estimates are based on declassified document from USSTRATCOM.
(23) Information from US relating to proceedure for Trident procurement in previous years.
(24) "Some three quarters of our current planned Trident missile procurement will be available for operational deployment", Hansard 23 July 1996.
(25) Letter from Miss I Burbridge, Directorate of Nuclear Policy, Ministry of Defence to Heather Williams, 23 February 1994.
(26) The Moscow Criterion, BBC, July 1995.
(27) Diaries, Alan Clark, p277.
(28) Cracking Under Pressure - the response to defects in British nuclear submarines, Scottish CND and Faslane Peace Camp, June 1992.
(29) Report of the panel on nuclear weapon safety of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representative, Chaired by Dr Sidney Drell, December 1990.